

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. _____

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE



25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

State Dept. review completed

25X1



Top Secret

(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET

25X1

Noted by DCI

5 September

5 September 1951

SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN

25X1

HIGHLIGHTS

The opening session on the evening of 4 September was devoted to an address by President Truman. Rules of procedure were adopted on the morning of 5 September at the second session, which featured Soviet/Satellite obstructionist tactics.

DEVELOPMENTS AT SAN FRANCISCO

1. No official summary on conference proceedings has been received as yet. The conference tactics and obstructionist intentions of the USSR were demonstrated at the second session. The Soviet bloc, comprised of the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, was unsuccessful in its attempts to force consideration of Chinese Communist participation and to block the adoption of the rules of procedure proposed by the US and the UK.

25X1

2. The Indonesian Foreign Minister informed US officials at San Francisco on 3 September that he was under instructions to report daily on developments at the conference, and that the Cabinet would make the decision on whether to sign the treaty. The US officials gained the impression that Indonesia would be willing to sign the treaty if given reasonable assurances that satisfactory arrangements could be worked out on economic questions such as fishing rights and reparations.

25X1

COMMENT: The US Ambassador in Djakarta believes it is likely that the Indonesian Government will sign, and thinks the treaty will subsequently secure Parliament's ratification.

3. Prime Minister Yoshida intends to discuss the Chinese signatory problem with US and UK representatives at San Francisco. The Japanese have indicated a firm intention to deal with the Nationalists eventually, but apparently fear that active moves in that direction might jeopardize prospects for an early bilateral treaty with India.

Document No. 1
No Change in Class. ☒
☐ Declassified

Changed For TS 3 0

24 July 78

By:

25X1

25X1

SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN
5 September 1951

25X1

4. A member of the Netherlands information bureau reportedly stated that the Netherlands delegates say confidentially among themselves that they do not expect Pakistan to sign the treaty. One delegate remarked that he would be surprised if any Asiatic nation except the Philippines and Associated States of Indochina signed. The same source reports that the Netherlands will sign the treaty. [REDACTED]

5. At a reception in San Francisco given for the British and American press, the impression was gained that the UK delegation is maintaining a cool and reserved attitude toward the Japanese delegation. The UK, however, appeared to be definitely trying to sell the treaty, and the UK Foreign Office press chief displayed considerable pride in the part the UK played in the treaty's preparation. [REDACTED]

25X1

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

2. According to information obtained by the US Ambassador in Colombo, Ceylon's Prime Minister has instructed Ceylon's delegation to sign the treaty in its present form or accept any changes in the present text that are more favorable to Japan. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

3. The Department of State is concerned over press reports that Prime Minister Nehru had told the Indian Parliament that Asian countries may hold a Japanese conference of their own after the US-sponsored conference ends, presumably to strengthen his influence over Burma and Indonesia and his future position with extreme nationalistic and socialist anti-American elements in Japan. Ambassador Henderson, however, is inclined to believe that Nehru's remarks were either misinterpreted or distorted. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN
5 September 1951

COMMENT: Mosaburo Suzuki, a former Communist and now the leader of the Japan Socialist Party, visited Nehru shortly before India decided not to attend the conference. It is likely that Nehru's subsequent decision may have been influenced in some degree by Suzuki's comments, which in turn were colored by his party's opposition to the Western treaty draft.